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Summary 
 
Each entity paying taxes would like to have real influence on the way of their allocation. Since 2004 in 
Poland payers of personal income tax were able to decide about donating 1 percent of personal income tax 
to a chosen public benefit organization for the first time. Since the introduction of the possibility of donating 
non-profit organization (NPO) tax regulations were repeatedly modified. Did tax-payers willingly use the 
ability to decide who they should donate their 1 percent of personal income tax to? In what way did changes 
of tax regulations influence taxpayers’ decision? In order to answer those questions soft modelling was used, 
which allowed to examine the influence of changes in regulations relating to 1 percent of personal income 
tax on taxpayers’ decision.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The initiative, which has been in force in Poland since 20042, allowing the taxpayers 
to decide on what purpose 1 percent of their personal income tax will be spent is not 
a novum. As early as in postwar years Spain and Italy permitted their citizens to donate 
a part of their taxes to Catholic Church. Since 1997 by virtue of the act on public bene-
fit from 1996 Hungarian citizens were given the possibility to donate 1 percent of their 
personal income tax to chosen non-governmental organization, and since 1998 they can 
additionally donate 1 percent of their personal income tax to chosen church [Makowski, 
2007]. Somewhat later than in Hungary in year 2000 in Slovakia there was passed an act 
on individual income tax, which predicted an ability to transfer 1 percent (currently 
2 percent) of taxes in aid of non-governmental organizations.  
Initially in Poland, in accordance with the act, only personal income taxpayers who 
individually filled in the tax form and also taxpayers paying lump sums on registered 
income could lower their income tax resulting from the tax return form by amount not 
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exceeding 1 percent of personal income tax and donate it to a selected NPO. Since 
2007 from a taxpayer's point of view, public benefit organization's support principles 
were simplified in a significant way, because having calculated 1 percent of personal 
income tax the taxpayer does not have to do a transfer on his own if he puts the 
counted amount, NPO name and KRS number while filling in PIT form, since it is 
the Tax Office that will take care of distribution of the tax.. 
The aim of the article is to examine taxpayers’ reactions to changes of the 1 percent 
personal income tax regulations. In order to make such analysis there was used the 
soft model [Wold, 1980; Rogowski. 1990; Mierzyńska, 1999], which is the generalized 
econometric model allowing to examine relationships between unobservable varia-
bles. The model was estimated basing on the data from the period 2003-2011 com-
ing from the Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
 
2. Specification of the soft model 
 
Each soft model consists of two submodels: internal and external. The first one de-
termines the scheme of dependence between hidden variables, while the second one 
comprises definitions of hidden variables [Rogowski, 1990, p. 33]. The external model 
describes relations between unobservable variables and their indicators. Hidden varia-
bles can be defined in two ways: deductively and inductively. In the first case it is as-
sumed that latent variable as a theoretical concept is a starting point to empirical da-
ta research, thus it is a prior indicator in relation to a given indicator. Ratios of such 
hidden variables are called reflective. They are supposed to be characterized by a high 
correlation between each other, because they react to changes of the same value. In 
the second inductive case, there occurs transfer from observable to hidden variables, 
while indicators are said to be emergent indicators [Perło, 2004, p. 137-138]. While cre-
ating models with unobservable variables, one should define connections between 
indicators and theoretical variable in the first place. Making the decision concerning 
choosing the type of indicators, which are included in the model, should result 
from previously accepted theoretical description [Rogowski, 1990, p. 25].  
 Internal relations in soft models have linear characteristics. An internal model 
accepted in presented analysis has got the following form: 
  ttt CHTRTPD   10   (1) 
where:  
tTPD  – tax-payers’ decision,  
tTRC  – tax regulations changes,  
10 , - model parameters,  
t - random factor. 
Both, internal and external model was presented on the Diagram1.  
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DIAGRAM 1. 
Soft model 
 
  
  
  
        – observable variable       – the ratio of the external model 
      – hidden variable      – the ratio of the internal model 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
 
There are two hidden variables described in the model: changes in tax regulations (TRC) 
as well as taxpayers’ decision (TPD) (indicator description is included in the Table 1).  
 
TABLE 1. 
Indicators of hidden variables 
Hidden variable Symbol indicator Meaning 
Tax regulations 
changes (TRC) 
TVA 
 
NRE 
time variable 
new principles of obligatory regulations of 1 
percent personal income tax 
Tax-payers’ decision 
(TPD) 
 
POTP 
 
 
AOIN 
the percentage of taxpayers, who declare income 
by general rules and donate 1 percent of personal 
income tax 
the amount of income on the accounts of public 
benefit  
organizations expressed as personal income tax 
percentage 
Source: author’s own elaboration. 
  
Tax regulations changes (TRC) were defined by two indicators. The one determined as 
new principles of obligatory regulations of 1 percent personal income tax donated to public benefit organi-
zations (NRE) reflects tax regulations changes included in the Public Benefit Activity 
and Volunteer Work, which took place in 2007. In order to grasp and picture those 
changes, NRE ratio was defined as dummy variable. During the period 2003-2006, 
while less advantageous for taxpayers regulations were still obligatory, the variable new 
principles of obligatory regulations of 1 percent personal income tax (NRE) takes value '0’ and '1' in 
the remaining period. Another indicator, the time variable (TVA) was expressed in years. 
As a result of including this indicator in the model, apart from tax regulation changes, 
TRC TPD
POTPP 
AOIN 
TVA 
NRE 
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there were also caught changes occurring in economy during the examined period, e.g.: 
inflation. Because the model was based on the data from 2003-211, the time variable 
takes values: 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011.  
Similarly to changes in tax regulations, the second of unobservable variables, that is tax-
payers’ decision (TPD), was as well defined by two indicators: the percentage of taxpayers who 
declare income by general rules and donate 1 percent of personal income tax NPO (POTP) as well as 
the amount of income on the accounts of public benefit organizations expressed as personal income tax 
percentage (AOIN). 
During the first year of existence of mandatory provisions of the public benefit ac-
tivity and service act only insignificant amount of taxpayers, just 0.34 percent of entitled 
to do so, decided to donate 1 percent of personal income tax to a chosen public benefit 
organization. Year by year the situation improved and taxpayers were more likely to 
support NPO (Diagram 2).  
 
DIAGRAM 2. 
The share of tax-payers accounting according to general rules, who sup-
ported NPO with 1 percent of output (in %) 
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Source: [Informacja dotycząca kwot 1% należnego podatku…, 2011, s. 6]. 
 
In 2006, the last year when the old rules were still valid, only about 7 percent of 
taxpayers, who could reduce their taxes to donate to NPO, did it. In the following 
year, i. e. the first year after the change of tax regulations there were nearly three times 
as many taxpayers who agreed to make a donation, that is approximately 20 percent, in 
2008 almost 28 percent. Since 2008 the number of tax-payers donating 1 percent of 
personal income tax to NPO increases to about 5 percentage points per year. Accord-
ing to data from 2011 nearly 43 percent of tax-payers accounting to general princi-
ples donated 1 percent of personal income tax to NPO.  
Similarly to the number of tax-payers accounting according to general rules, who 
supported NPO with 1 percent of personal income tax, in the initial period of the 
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existence of public benefit organization and service act, the share of amounts from 
1 percent of personal income tax was on a really low level. In 2003 NPO taxpayers do-
nated only 0.03 percent of personal income tax. The greatest increase of the amount 
constituting 1 percent of personal income tax took place right after the introduction 
of new regulations i.e. 2007 (in 2006: 0.28 percent while in 2007: 0.64 percent ). In 2011 
the amount which was donated to public benefit organizations by taxpayers made up 
0.71 percent of personal income tax. Shaping the share level of amount donated to 
NPO by taxpayers expressed as personal income tax percentage in years 2003-2011 
is pictured in Diagram 3.  
 
DIAGRAM 3. 
The share of amount donated by NPO tax-payers expressed as personal  
income tax percentage (in %) 
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Source: [Informacja dotycząca kwot 1% należnego podatku…, 2011, s. 6]. 
 
 
3. Estimation and verification of the model 
 
The soft model was estimated by the partial method of the smallest squares, which 
allows concurrent obtaining of the parameters’ assessment of the internal and external 
model. As a result of estimation the following assessment of parameters of internal rela-
tions was received (estimation errors were presented in the brackets). 
0.9881=R           398.881- 0.9942    2
(8.8244)t(0.0229)
^
t TRCTPD   
Estimations of model parameters meet the expectations. The number value at 
the parameter TRC is 0.9942 which means significant influence of tax regulations 
changes referring to one percent of personal income tax on taxpayers’ behavior. 
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In the above model the parameters are considerably non-zero and the value of 
the coefficient of determination R2 is 0.9881, which means a very good adjustment to 
estimated values of hidden variables. 
As indicators occurring in the models are reflective indicators, the analysis of 
variables is done on the basis of factor loadings. These loadings are correlation co-
efficients among unobservable variable and its indicators, which were compiled in 
the Table 2, in Diagram 4. and in Diagram 5. 
 
TABLE 2. 
Estimating parameters of external relations in the soft model 
Hidden variable Symbol indicator Factor loadings  (standard error) 
TVA 
0.9658 
(0.0005) 
Tax regulations changes (TRC) 
NRE 0.9661 (0.0005) 
POTP 
0.9769 
(0.0063) 
Taxpayers’ decision  
(TPD) 
 
AOIN 0.9756 (0.0071) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the results of soft modeling. 
 
DIAGRAM 4. 
Value of factor loadings of latent variable indicators changes in tax regulations 
0,95 0,955 0,96 0,965 0,97 0,975 0,98
NZOP
ZCZ
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the results of soft modeling 
 
All ratios describing both hidden variables of this model are stimulants, so the 
increase of their values causes the growth of those variables. The variable of tax reg-
ulations changes is illustrated the best by new obligatory principles of 1 percent personal income 
tax actsZ ratio (0.9661) and slightly less by time variable ratio (0.9658). The variable 
taxpayers decision is strongly presented by the percentage of taxpayers, who settle up ac-
cording to general rules and donate 1 percent of personal income tax to NPO (0.9769), a bit 
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weaker by the amount of sum, which was transferred to public benefit organizations' accounts 
expressed as personal income tax percentage (0.9756). 
 
DIAGRAM 5. 
Value of factor loadings of latent variable indicators tax-payers’ decision  
0,95 0,955 0,96 0,965 0,97 0,975 0,98
PWOPP
KPOPP
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the results of soft modeling. 
 
Based on received soft model estimations referring to both external and internal 
relations the model was verified positively. Evaluations of models quality can also be 
done on the basis of Stone-Geisser’s test, which verifies the model in terms of its use-
fulness in prediction.  
 
TABLE 3 
The value of the test Stone-Geisser general and for indicators 
Symbol indicator The value of the test S-G 
POTP 0.7956 
AOIN 0.7372 
General value of S-G test  0.7955 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the results of soft modeling 
 
General value of S-G test as well as S-G values for particular hidden variable in-
dicator are greater than zero, what gives evidence of good prognostic value of the 
model (table 3.). 
 
 
4. Analyzed of the results 
 
Using PLS method allows not only to estimate the relations between hidden var-
iables, but also to estimate values of those variables. As a result we receive a synthetic 
variable whose values do not have substantial interpretation, but can be used in com-
parison analysis. Ratios of synthetic meter defining taxpayers decision were presented in 
Diagram 6. 
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DIAGRAM 6. 
Values of synthetic meter 
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Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the results of soft modeling. 
 
It is necessary to remember, that the variable taxpayers’ decision is mirrored by two 
ratios and that not only external model but the internal as well has impact on esti-
mating its value.  
In the first year of the existence of the act on public benefit activity and service there 
occurred the smallest over nine analysed years taxpayers’ interest in such a form of do-
nating NPO. It happened due to complication of the rules. Initially, principles relating to 
supporting NPO with 1 percent of personal income tax had a form of classic tax allow-
ance. The taxpayer only after making a payment in favor of a chosen public benefit or-
ganization was able to count out not more than one percent of personal income tax. 
Such a construction surely did not have a beneficial effect on taxpayers’ interest in this 
kind of donating NPO. It did not only require significantly higher activity, but also 
bearing additional costs and time, which had to be sacrificed in order to transfer specific 
amount to NPO in a proper way. One should also remember to archive a transfer con-
firmation, because such a document needs to be shown in case of inspection. What is 
more, the number of institutions having the status of a public benefit organization was 
really limited, because their registration started not until 1st January 2004. 
Year by year the situation was improving. Not only did more and more people make 
a decision to donate 1 percent of personal income tax but there was also growth in val-
ues of donations transferred to NPO accounts. The biggest change in synthetic meter 
value took place in 2007, that is right after the modification of regulations. Those 
changes were mainly a result of simplifying the process of donating 1 percent of per-
sonal income tax to NPO, because since 2007 it has been The Revenue Office, not 
a tax-payer, which is responsible to transfer money specified in tax return to accounts 
of public benefit organizations. Apart from urgent reaction of taxpayers to changes of 
regulations regarding donating public benefit organizations with 1 percent of personal 
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income tax, which took place in 2007, the years 2004 and 2008 were periods, when the 
growth of synthetic meter value defining taxpayers’ decision was the highest. It means that 
tax-payers reacted rationally to changes in tax regulations, but with a certain lag. In 2009 
the value of synthetic meter was lower than in 2008, due to modifications of tax scale.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Soft modelling is one of methods used to examine relations occurring between 
unobservable variables. Received results show a very strong positive and statistically 
important dependence occurring between hidden variables. According to carried 
analysis, tax regulation changes variable was affected by modifications of tax regulations 
in 2007, which related to the way of changing the mechanism of allocation not direct-
ly from taxpayers but managers of The Revenue Office and with the extension of 
taxpayers’ circle, who could use this form of supporting socially useful activity.  
It is necessary to remember that when estimating the soft model using PLS method 
there are also received estimations of values of directly unobservable variables, which 
even though lack substantial interpretation are used in comparison analysis. Estimations 
of hidden variables allowed to capture those periods, when taxpayers reacted the hard-
est on modification of tax regulations and formulating a statement that tax-payers react 
to all changes rationally, but with a delay. 
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